These claims are compelling. Stuxnet has strong technical characteristics.
Yet more important is the political and strategic context in which new cyber threats are emerging, and the effects the worm has generated in this respect.
Perhaps most striking is the confluence between cyber crime and state action. States are capitalising on technology whose development is driven by cyber crime, and perhaps outsourcing cyber attacks to non-attributable third parties, including criminal organisations (see essay by Alexander Klimburg in this issue).
Worms as weapons
Stuxnet is a sophisticated computer program designed to penetrate and establish control over remote systems in a quasi-autonomous fashion. It represents a new generation of 'fire-and-forget' malware that can be aimed in cyberspace against selected targets. Those that Stuxnet targeted were 'airgapped'; in other words, they were not connected to the public Internet and penetration required the use of intermediary devices such as USB sticks to gain access and establish control. Using four 'zero-day vulnerabilities' (vulnerabilities previously unknown, so that there has been no time to develop and distribute patches), the Stuxnet worm employs Siemens' default passwords to access Windows operating systems that run the WinCC and PCS 7 programs.
5 These are programmable logic controller (PLC) programs that manage industrial plants. The genius of the worm is that it can strike and reprogram a computer target.
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First Stuxnet hunted down frequency-converter drives made by Fararo
Paya in Iran and Vacon in Finland. These each respond to the PLC computer commands that control the speed of a motor by regulating how much power is fed to it. These drives are set at the very high speeds required by centrifuges to separate and concentrate the uranium-235 isotope for use in light-water reactors and, at higher levels of enrichment, for use as fissile material for nuclear weapons.
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Then Stuxnet alternated the frequency of the electrical current that powers the centrifuges, causing them to switch back and forth between high and low speeds at intervals for which the machines were not designed. frequencies and thus the speed of the motors for short intervals over a period of months. Interfering with the speed of the motors sabotages the normal operation of the industrial control process.' 8 In a devious touch, the worm contains a rootkit that conceals commands downloaded from the Siemens systems.
Symantec researcher Eric Chien put it this way: 'Stuxnet changes the output
Some media reports mistakenly thought the Iranian light-water power reactor at Bushehr was also a target. Iran confirmed that Stuxnet infected personal computers there while denying that much damage was inflicted.
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But Bushehr seems an unlikely target, because the plutonium produced by such light-water reactors is not well suited for weapons purposes. The more likely target is Iran's uranium-enrichment programme. Although most of the 4,000-5,000 centrifuges operating to date at the pilot and industrial-scale fuel-enrichment facilities at Natanz have been producing only low-enriched uranium, the same centrifuges could be put to use to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons. Alternatively, and in a more likely scenario, it is feared that Iran could be operating secret centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium. The key to the Stuxnet worm is that it can attack both known and unknown centrifuges. This approach comes at a cost. Despite its relative sophistication, Stuxnet was quickly and effectively disarmed. Within months its technical characteristics and components were well known. Iran was able to quickly harness the intellectual capital of the global computer security community through effectively crowdsourcing solutions to the worm, casting some doubt on the conventional wisdom and hype surrounding the efficacy of computer network attacks. Stuxnet's rapid neutralisation also raises the question of why this approach, rather than a more stealthy or direct one, was chosen to target Tehran's nuclear programme. The answer depends
Emerging modes of cyber war

Stuxnet was quickly disarmed
upon the strategic and political goals the Stuxnet attackers aimed to achieve.
There has been much speculation that Israel or possibly the United States may launch air strikes to retard Iran's nuclear programme during 2011, although it seems unlikely that President Barack Obama would consent to US strikes. 13 The costs and benefits of such action have been widely debated.
14 Recent statements by Arab leaders expressing concern about the Iranian nuclear threat have given Israel's rationale for action new credibility and a stronger claim to legitimacy. The WikiLeaks disclosure of confidential US diplomatic cables in December 2010 has strengthened Tel Aviv's hand. The answers to many such questions, for better or worse, will be driven by political, diplomatic and strategic considerations, rather than abstract debates about rules of international law. Changing the standards for attribution would shift the boundaries currently placing cyber outside of the laws of armed conflict and international law and back under the UN Charter. It would also make cyber consistent with the US National Security Strategy, which since 9/11 holds nations responsible for harbouring a party that has launched an attack, and reserves the right to pre-emptive action to prevent, deter or interdict attack. Such a shift would also cast into high relief the issue of whether a response through cyber represents the option of first or last resort and meets the tests of necessity and proportionality under international law. As Lin points out, these issues as they apply to cyber remain untested: 'This is new territory and mandates new thinking as states develop policies for the future to counter and protect against cyber attack'. Where might debate as to the status of Stuxnet -or a future, more deadly version of it -as a use of force and armed attack lead? Israel and the United
States would argue that action to retard or destroy Iranian nuclear facilities constitutes an act of self-defence against an existential threat, is not prohibited, prevents a potentially destructive arms race in the region, and is thus sanctioned by Article 51 of the charter. 38 Iran would argue that this interpretation stretches beyond reason the notion of self-defence and that
Stuxnet was a prohibited interference in its internal affairs. While asserting a right to develop peaceful nuclear power, Iran has denied any intention to build nuclear weapons, even though centrifuges at Natanz make little sense except as part of an effort to achieve at least a threshold weapons capability. 39 It contends alternatively that its goals are purely defensive and represent no threat to non-aggressors.
* * *
It is not clear how much physical damage must be sustained to qualify an attack as use of force. In the context of the scale question, Lin asks 'is there (or should there be) a class of cyber attacks whose limited scope makes it a use of force, but nevertheless entitles the target to some action in selfdefense that goes beyond protecting the immediate target?'. 40 There is also a corollary issue as to whether an attack that intends but fails to inflict greater harm fits into that category. The implications of these scenarios illustrate the complications that cyber attack holds for the future. Cyber attack is A well-executed cyber attack offers the opportunity for sophisticated targeting. But if damage from cyber attacks can be quickly repaired, careful strategic thought is required in comparing the cost and benefits of cyber versus traditional military attack. One important benefit of cyber attack, to be sure, may be its greater opportunity to achieve goals such as retarding the Iranian nuclear programme without causing the loss of life or injury to innocent civilians that air strikes would seem more likely to inflict.
Difficulty in identifying a cyber attacker presents multiple headaches for responding. Nations such as Iran or Israel will act to protect their interests, but they would prefer the international community recognise the legitimacy of the action they take. 
